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343 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARRIAGE OF 
PERSONALITY AND IMPERSONALITY: 
OFFICE, HONOR, AND THE OATH 
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University 
Press. 2017. Pp. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper). 
Paul Horwitz2 
Randy Kozel’s book, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of 
Precedent, is a splendid accomplishment. It is clarifying in its 
treatment of the existing law of precedent, reasonable in its 
proposals for modifications of that law, and thoughtful and careful 
throughout. More than that, it sparkles. Ideas and apothegms 
adorn every page. As the diverse responses in this review 
symposium suggest, despite its concision, Settled Versus Right 
generates countless questions, befitting both the vital field of law 
it treats and the depth and breadth of Kozel’s discussion. The 
pleasure and agony consist in selecting just one aspect of the book 
for discussion, when it provides such a wealth of material to 
choose from. 
One key element of Kozel’s book is its identification of 
“impersonality” as a central good served by precedent. The 
book’s introduction asserts that a key benefit of stare decisis is that 
“the potential vacillation of constitutional law following changes 
in judicial personnel is replaced by an abiding sense of stability 
and impersonality” (p. 18). The book concludes, “Deference to 
prior decisions takes the abstract ideal of impersonal judging and 
transforms it into something concrete. Judges come and go, but 
 
  1. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Notre Dame 
Law School. 
 2. Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to 
the participants in the symposium on Randy Kozel’s book held at the University of 
Richmond School of Law in April 2017 for questions and discussion, to Kurt Lash and 
Jason Mazzone for organizing that event, and to Randy Kozel both for his comments and 
for his book, which provided the splendid occasion for that discussion. 
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the law remains the law. That is the promise of precedent” (p. 
176). Impersonality—as an essential quality of law, a crucial 
feature of judging, and a compromise or sacrifice made by 
individual judges in the service of a “continuous and impersonal 
Court”—is one of the book’s dominant ideals (p. 164). 
Such a sacrifice demands a great deal of a judge, or indeed of 
any individual. This is especially true in a culture in which the 
dominant modes of self-understanding and action do not involve 
impersonality, but strong attachments to specific substantive 
commitments; individual visions of life, law, and justice; political 
commitments and polarization; and other deeply personal views. 
In the face of this culture and its powerful motivations, why would 
one willingly submerge and sacrifice oneself, and one’s deepest 
conceptions of justice, for the sake of a “continuous and 
impersonal Court” (p. 164)? Even if doing so is understood to be 
the duty of a “good” judge, why settle for dutiful obedience if it 
risks sacrificing one’s deepest substantive commitments? Why be 
a mere “good” judge, dutifully following precedent, when one can 
be a great judge, celebrated for one’s boldness and one’s dramatic 
effect on the substance of the law?3 One can understand why 
judges often fall short of the mark of impersonality set by Kozel. 
Nor is this true only of judges, or of legal officials more 
generally. Impersonality is in disrepute throughout our culture 
today: our official and professional culture, our popular culture, 
and our public discourse. A judge, or some other individual, who 
is committed to impersonality or required to strive for it will need 
a substantial amount of virtue and character to resist the call of 
personality and substantive justice. She will need a strong source 
of motivation to supply the energy and restraint needed to persist 
in the face of these dominant social, political, and legal currents. 
Although I do not doubt that Kozel’s book will be much admired, 
I suspect that many readers will resist any edifice of law and 
precedent built on a foundation of impersonality. Even those 
judges who agree with him will need something more than “the 
 
 3. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 
87, N.Y. TIMES: OBITUARIES (April 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/
obituaries/stephen-reinhardt-liberal-lion-of-federal-court-dies-at-87.html (noting the 
response of Judge Reinhardt, unquestionably celebrated as a “great” judge by many, to 
the large number of reversals he faced at the Supreme Court: “They can’t catch ‘em all”); 
id. (quoting a former clerk noting of Judge Reinhardt’s repeated dissents in death penalty 
cases that “[I]t was the right thing to do, and that’s what mattered. He wanted his voice 
and his objections heard.”).  
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loftiest Law Day rhetoric” about “‘the rule of law’” to lash 
themselves to the mast of impersonality.4  
In this reaction to Kozel’s focus on individual subordination 
to the ideal of impersonality, I focus on a vision of judging—or of 
any office—that draws on values beyond the constitutional text to 
supply the energy and motivation necessary to achieve what 
Kozel seeks. That vision is not impersonal, but personal. It uses 
personal motivations to tie the individual officeholder to the 
“impersonal” features of his or her office. It is not a set of 
prescriptions or an instruction manual for what judges should do, 
but for who they should be.5 It is virtue- and character-centered 
rather than purely institutional, impersonal, or mechanical.6 And, 
as both the ancients and the early moderns did, it seeks to ensure 
virtue and character in part by tying it to personal motives rather 
than hoping that officials or others will be virtuous for the sake of 
virtue itself. In short, it seeks to achieve Kozel’s vision of 
 
 4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008).  
 5. This is, I believe, the main distinction between my work and that of Professor 
Richard Re, whose excellent scholarship on oaths is concerned with many of the same 
issues I am in an ongoing project on oaths and the Constitution. See Richard M. Re, 
Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 305 (2016) (drawing from the oath 
specific “implications for interpretive methodologies, substantive commitments, and 
constitutional change”); Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor,” 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1149, 1153 (2017) (“explor[ing] the possibility that the federal judicial oath calls for some 
measure of substantive economic equality” in judicial interpretations of the Constitution).  
 6. For introductory and basic texts on virtue ethics and the law, see VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE (Collin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); LAW, VIRTUE, AND 
JUSTICE (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Virtue, 
in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 491 (Lorraine Besser-Jones & 
Michael Slote eds., 2015); Chapin Cimino, Virtue Jurisprudence, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF VIRTUE 621 (Nancy E. Snow ed., 2018). For a discussion of virtue ethics 
and constitutional law, including the role of precedent, see Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 521 (2004) (listing 
adherence to precedent as the first of six basic principles of virtuous constitutional 
judging). Recent events are, I venture to suggest, sparking a wider interest among legal 
scholars in the role of virtue and character in constitutional officeholding and 
constitutional interpretation. For an interesting example, see Sanford Levinson & Mark 
A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional 
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 145–51 (2018) 
(emphasizing the central role of character and virtue in the original constitutional design 
and the expectations of its designers, and noting the importance of “integrat[ing] character 
and institutions” as opposed to a view of constitutional interpretation that is indifferent to 
the character of the actual individuals occupying constitutional offices). Levinson and 
Graber suggest that President Donald Trump does not quite manage to embody these 
character traits. See id. at 140–45 (offering evidence of “Donald Trump’s gross unfitness 
for office”).  
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impersonality through the device of personality—properly 
understood, channeled, and constrained. 
Given space and other constraints, I offer here only a brief 
sketch of what such a vision involves, and I do not address the 
many sound criticisms that could be made of such a vision, 
whether in its details or in its plausibility, especially in 
contemporary society.7 My goal is neither to bury nor to praise 
Kozel’s theory of precedent. It is to supplement it, by offering one 
way to think about how to achieve the “abstract ideal of 
impersonal judging” that Kozel sees as one of the central 
“promise[s] of precedent” (p. 176). 
* * * 
Our constitutional text and culture8 rely on three interrelated 
“institutions”9 to achieve sound governance by those holding 
offices under the Constitution. This troika of institutions consists 
of office, honor, and the oath. I will sketch each institution, and 
its relationship to the others, in turn. 
Office. The notion of office dates back at least to the 
evolution of the concept in ancient Roman law and government.10 
The term itself derives from “the classical concept of officium, the 
sense of duty belonging to a person with recognized 
responsibilities.”11 
 
 7. For a preliminary but more detailed discussion, see Paul Horwitz, Honour, Oaths, 
and the Rule of Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Some of the material 
below draws heavily on that manuscript, which itself flows from my Coxford Lecture on 
honor and the rule of law at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law in March 
2016. 
 8. Cf. Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 
(2013) (describing a “‘small-c’ approach” to the Constitution under which American 
constitutionalism involves “the web of documents, practices, institutions, norms, and 
traditions that structure American government”) (citation omitted).  
 9. “Institution” is meant here not to refer to specific organizational forms, but to 
“commonly accepted norms and understandings that organize behavior in any given 
setting over time.” See Michael R. Siebecker, Building a “New Institutional” Approach to 
Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247, 259 (2008). It “encompasses individuals, groups, 
relationships, and cognitive schemes and frames for constructing them.” Michael J. 
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1628 
(2004). It can range from “the handshake to marriage to, presumably, sanctioning 
regimes.” John R. Sutton, Rethinking Social Control, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 943, 946 (1996) 
(reviewing THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. 
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991)).  
 10. For an especially rich treatment, see J.E. LENDON, EMPIRE OF HONOUR: THE 
ART OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ROMAN WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press paperback ed., 2001).  
 11. Joshua Getzler, An Interdisciplinary View of Fiduciary Law: “As If.” 
Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 973, 981 (2011) (citing MARCUS 
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This conception remains relevant today, despite considerable 
change in how (or how strongly) it is viewed. As Steve Sheppard 
writes, “The building blocks of a modern legal system are offices, 
and the essential purpose of offices is to fulfill tasks of the legal 
system.”12 Sheppard defines legal officials as “the individuals in 
whom all of the powers of the state are allocated, divided among 
many roles.”13 In each case, “the official is both empowered and 
limited by the law,” both subject to “the legal obligations 
embedded in that particular office by the rules of law” and, within 
the scope of that office, possessing substantial “discretion to act 
or not to act.”14 
This understanding was reflected in English and early 
American law, which defined “office” as “ . . . a duty. Although in 
general an office was a moral duty, in government it was the 
specialized office or duty of a particular government employee or 
servant.”15 Although the modern conception of a governmental 
office became more bureaucratized over time, and the officer 
came to be seen simply as whichever person happens to fill that 
office at the moment, it was still essential to the evolving English 
understanding of the concept of office that it involved “both a 
duty and the position of a particular officer.”16 Thus, Richard 
Hutton, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, asked: “What are 
the highest places, but obligations of the greatest dewties?”17 “The 
citizen who becomes an official” thus “accepts an array of 
additional duties that differ from those of [other legal] subjects.”18 
Different offices and officers, of course, have different 
duties.19 Judges, in particular, have a set of judicial duties that 
 
TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 6 (Arthur L. Humphreys 1902) (44 B.C.E.)).  
 12. STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
LEGAL OFFICIALS 10 (2009).  
 13. Id. at 20.  
 14. Id. at 20, 21; see also id. at 22 (“[O]ffices have powers that are circumscribed so 
that they can only be used toward certain ends at certain times and in certain ways. This 
circumscription is established by the same legal obligations that, within these boundaries, 
describe the powers the official controls to act according to the official’s substantive 
discretion.”).  
 15. Philip Hamburger, Judicial Office, 6 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 53, 54 (2011).  
 16. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 104 (2008).  
 17. Id. at 125 (quoting THE DIARY OF SIR RICHARD HUTTON 1614-1639 (W.R. Prest, 
ed.,  1991)). 
 18. SHEPPARD, supra note 12, at 95.  
 19. Cf. ANDREW SABL, RULING PASSIONS: POLITICAL OFFICES AND DEMOCRATIC 
ETHICS (2002) (discussing the different functions performed by different officers and other 
key democratic actors and the different practices and qualities of character required by 
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define the judicial office. Modern discussions of judging and 
judicial review often speak in terms of judicial authority or power. 
A focus on judicial duty, and the limitations it imposes on the 
performance of one’s office as a judge, encourages us to think 
differently about the judicial role and the relationships of 
individual judges to that role and its obligations—including the 
obligation to follow precedent.20 
Honor. As the ancient and modern writers alike understood 
full well, office does not magically transform its occupant into a 
Solon or Solomon or divest that person of human frailty. Despite 
our attachment to the proposition that ours is “a government of 
laws and not of men,”21 the character and virtue of the men and 
women who occupy offices was and remains an essential element 
of our political and constitutional order.22 
As those writers also understood, however, even if we select 
virtuous individuals to occupy important offices, they will not 
maintain those virtues without powerful motivations. Ambition 
and a desire for glory comprise one such motivation: “the love of 
fame,” which Hamilton called “the ruling passion of the noblest 
minds.”23 Such a motivation is not a virtue in itself, and is as likely 
to lead one astray as to keep one on the path of virtue. It must be 
channeled productively.  
The institution that does so is the love of honor. Honor, 
properly understood, is neither merely outward-looking nor 
merely the desire for fame. It is the desire to be thought well of 
by those whose opinion ought to matter, and the desire 
to deserve to be thought well of by those individuals. It is Janus-
faced, both inward-and outward-looking. As the anthropologist 
Julian Pitt-Rivers defined it: 
Honor is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the 
eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his 
claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, 
his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.24 
 
each).  
 20. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 1–2, 9–14.  
 21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  
 22. Cf. Levinson & Graber, supra note 6.  
 23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST 488 (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
 24. JULIAN PITT-RIVERS, HONOUR AND SOCIAL STATUS, IN HONOUR AND SHAME: 
THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 19, 22 (J.G. Péristiany ed., 1965) (emphasis 
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At its best, honor seeks regard in the eyes of those real or 
imagined individuals who are worthy to confer it: what Cicero 
called “the agreed approval of good men.”25 Crucially, this desire 
is internalized, so that the office holder wants to exemplify the 
virtues that ought to accompany earned honor, whether those 
virtues are publicly recognized or not. As Adam Smith wrote, 
honor involves not just a desire for approval, but “a desire of 
being what ought to be approved of.”26 In her invaluable book on 
liberalism and honor, Sharon Krause speaks in terms of “a quality 
of character, the ambitious desire to live up to one’s code and to 
be publicly recognized for doing so.”27 Honor, thus understood, is 
both less and more than a virtue. It is a motivation and spur to 
virtuous conduct, but one that is experienced internally as the 
desire to earn honor properly and virtuously.  
As Krause argues, in terms that are highly relevant to the 
question of what will provide judges with the personal 
motivations that will convince them to honor precedent and thus 
value “impersonality” highly, this conception of honor may be 
more rather than less urgent in our contemporary, egalitarian 
democratic society. A strong motivation is needed if 
 
in original). 
 25. PETER OLSTHOORN, HONOR IN POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 24 (2015) 
(quoting CICERO, Tusculanae Disputationes III.3–4). 
 26. Id. at 8 (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS III.2.7: 
Oxford Clarendon Press 1976) (1759)) (emphasis added). 
 27. SHARON KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 2 (2002). Krause’s book is 
essential reading for those who are interested in the value and viability of honor in 
contemporary liberal democracies, and is the leading edge of a number of recent writings 
constituting what we might call modern “honor studies.” A short list, in alphabetical order, 
would include: KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL 
REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010); ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM, MODERN HONOR: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE (2013); KRAUSE, supra note 27; OLSTHOORN, supra note 25; 
ROBERT L. OPRISKO, HONOR: A PHENOMENOLOGY (2012); WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS, 
HONOR FOR US: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE (2010); 
BRUCE CRAIG SMITH, AMERICAN HONOR: THE CREATION OF THE NATION’S IDEALS 
DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (2018); TAMLER SOMMERS, WHY HONOR 
MATTERS (2018); FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR (1994); JEREMY WALDRON, 
DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012) (comparing honor and 
dignity); ALEXANDER WELSH, WHAT IS HONOR?: A QUESTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES 
(2008). Also relevant to the study of honor, although I make no use of it here, is Stephen 
Darwall’s philosophical work on so-called “second-personal ethics.” See STEPHEN 
DARWALL, MORALITY, AUTHORITY, AND LAW: ESSAYS IN SECOND-PERSONAL ETHICS 
I (2013); STEPHEN DARWALL, HONOR, HISTORY, AND RELATIONSHIP: ESSAYS IN 
SECOND-PERSONAL ETHICS II (2013); STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON 
STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2009). A recent edited 
collection provides an excellent survey of the field. See HONOR IN THE MODERN WORLD: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Laurie M. Johnson & Dan Demetriou eds., 2016).  
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officeholders—including judges—are to exhibit qualities of virtue 
and excellence. That motivation must be especially strong where 
doing so might conflict with their own substantive views of law or 
justice, or deprive them of opportunities to put their own stamp 
on the law and gain some measure of glory. In her argument, 
“liberal honor” fills that role. It supplies the basis for the personal 
agency that can bring out these qualities in the individual and give 
him or her the strength of character to maintain them in the face 
of contrary pressures. 
At least since Peter Berger, drawing on a long set of historical 
developments, wrote about the “obsolescence of the concept of 
honor,” honor has been widely viewed with suspicion or outright 
hostility. In particular, it has been unfavorably compared with the 
democratic quality of equal human dignity.28 But demanding 
honorable conduct from our highest officials, and encouraging in 
them a sense of honor, is not incompatible with a belief in equal 
human dignity. Indeed, encouraging honor as a motivation for 
officeholders may be necessary, supplying the energy and agency 
that will lead officeholders to maintain a legal and political regime 
in which human dignity is forcefully defended and advanced. For 
the purposes of Kozel’s book, that includes the desire to treat 
cases “impersonally,” respecting the equal dignity of litigants by 
treating them similarly, rather than treating like cases differently 
or departing from precedent based on a judge’s personal view of 
the parties in a particular case.  
Oath. In our constitutional system, the device that ties 
individual honor to the ostensibly “impersonal” office, and that 
encourages honor properly understood and internalized rather 
than the mere love of fame, is the oath. Most or all officials take 
an oath to defend the Constitution,29 and judges take oaths that 
commit them to a particular vision of justice and judicial duty.30 
 
 28. See PETER BERGER, ON THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF HONOUR, 
reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). See also 
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
225–56 (1989).  
 29. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before 
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial Officers, both of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by 
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”). I place oaths and affirmations on 
equal footing here and refer generically to the “oath.”  
 30. See 8 U.S.C. § 453 (1990); Re, supra note 5, at 1166 n.89 (citing examples of state 
constitutional provisions providing for judicial oaths).  
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The oath serves multiple functions. It is a prerequisite to and 
a performative act for taking office.31 It solemnizes the act of 
taking office and commits the oath-taker to act faithfully to fulfill 
the duties, and observe the limits, of that office.32 And it is 
a publicly performed act, one that ties the oath-taker to public 
regard and calls on him or her to maintain the approval and avoid 
the disapprobation of both his or her peers—or “honor group”—
and the wider public community he or she serves.33 
Despite its religious roots in calling on God to witness the 
promise, the oath is no more magical a device than office itself. 
But it is or can be—or ought to be—a powerful, even 
transformative, device. It serves as a linchpin. It connects the 
individual to the office and the officeholder to the commitment to 
act honorably. The oath thus provides a deeply personal motive 
and wellspring for the commitment to “impersonality” in judicial 
office. It is tied to both an internalized personal sense of honor 
and a desire to be seen by one’s peers and others as having acted 
honorably. To be sure, these qualities, and the oath that serves to 
connect them to the individual and the office, are aspirational and 
rarely completely fulfilled. It is imperfect. But that does not make 
it unimportant or a mere fiction.34  
 
 31. See, e.g., JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF 
LAWLESS JUDGING 155 (2010). For a rich discussion of the oath, including its performative 
nature, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE SACRAMENT OF LANGUAGE: AN ARCHAEOLOGY 
OF THE OATH (Adam Kotsko trans., 2011).  
 32. See, e.g., Steve Sheppard, What Oaths Meant to the Framers’ Generation: A 
Preliminary Sketch, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 273, 276; HAMBURGER, supra note 
16, at 109; Daniel P. Sulmasy, What is an Oath and Why Should a Physician Swear One?, 
20 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 329, 332 (1999).  
 33. See Sulmasy, supra note 32, at 332; Sheppard, supra note 32, at 107; 
HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 106–08. 
 34. At least judges say they take the oath seriously and are impressed by the 
solemnity of the act. See, e.g., Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, Judge Frank J. Battisti and the 
Promises He Kept, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 367, 367 (1994) (“Judge Battisti viewed the oath 
of office very seriously. Swearing-in ceremonies were important to him and he presided 
with great solemnity over them. He considered the assumption of public office to be on 
par with the undertaking of a sacred trust.”). The language here is strikingly similar to the 
discussion above of offices, which have been described as “‘trusts’ to be executed by public 
officials,” and which are “bound on the conscience” of the oath-taker as a kind of fiduciary 
duty. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 93 (1988) (quoting 14 WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 191 (Robert Rutland, ed., 1983)). Not incidentally to the office- and 
virtue-based approach taken here, a recent strain of public law literature emphasizes the 
fiduciary nature of public officials in constitutional systems and seeks to draw implications 
for judging and other official actions. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, A 
GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 
(2017); EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 
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* * * 
This vision of the troika of office, honor, and the oath is 
intended as a modest supplement to Kozel’s careful account of 
precedent. It may place a different gloss on his emphasis on 
“continuity, constraint, and impersonality” as the core judicial 
ideals (p. 4). To paraphrase Justice Blackmun, it suggests that in 
order to achieve judicial impersonality we must first take account 
of personality—of the motivations that give judges the agency and 
energy to strive for impersonality in a personal world.35 It 
certainly does not demand, however, that we reject Kozel’s 
emphasis on the importance of impersonality in judging and the 
law of precedent. 
Neither, unfortunately, does it tell us how to resolve the 
difficult questions and compromises that are involved in Kozel’s 
account—or any account—of judicial precedent. It does not tell 
us when or how to respect and observe, to reject, or to modify a 
particular precedent. But it may offer a way of thinking about 
the judicial oath, the judicial office, and the relationship of both 
to precedent and its difficulties. That way of thinking may help 
raise useful questions about both Kozel’s book and the judicial 
task itself. 
In possible tension with Kozel’s desire to find an approach to 
precedent that is compatible with “interpretive pluralism” on the 
Supreme Court (pp. 11-17), a virtue-based approach grounded in 
the troika of office, honor, and oath suggests that each judge, in 
taking the oath, faces an indefeasible obligation to reflect on what 
the judicial office and judicial duty demand, and to follow that 
 
(2012); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
513 (2015); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael Sirota, A Fiduciary Theory of 
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the 
Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004). For critiques, see, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Stephen 
R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); Seth Davis, 
The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145 (2014).  
  In this review symposium, Professor Allison Orr Larsen usefully examines 
various existing or proposed practices on the Supreme Court that can entrench and 
enhance this perspective and encourage judicial “norms of impersonality.” Allison Orr 
Larsen, Supreme Court Norms of Impersonality, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 373 (2018). 
Professor Larsen’s contribution surely has far more immediate practical value than mine. 
But both can be read together productively, inasmuch as her article offers concrete means 
of encouraging and holding judges to the higher-level but more abstract virtue-based 
approach that I argue for here.  
 35. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of 
race.”). 
1 - HORWITZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/6/18 10:54 AM 
2018] OFFICE, HONOR, AND THE OATH 353 
 
vision faithfully.36 But in connecting that indefeasible personal 
obligation to a sense of office that focuses on duty and constraint 
rather than power, it requires a commitment to an office-centered 
vision of justice, rather than one that is strictly personal or 
idiosyncratic. That commitment may require obedience to 
precedent, and self-restraint in the face of a desire to radically 
reshape the law or remake it in one’s own image of justice. It 
requires the judge to “do the office of a Judge, and to receive 
information by witnesses and solemnities of law, and . . . not to 
bring his own private conscience to become the public measure.”37 
And, through the oath, it connects that obedience to 
the individual judge’s personal and official honor: to his or her 
desire to be, and be seen to be, a loyal and virtuous officeholder 
and oath-keeper.  
For better and worse, there is nothing mechanical or exact 
about this vision. It does not answer the questions that Kozel asks, 
or that flow from a careful examination of his description of and 
prescriptions for the law of judicial precedent. But it may suggest 
that we should view those questions differently: perhaps 
differently than Kozel does, and certainly differently than our 
contemporary legal and political culture generally does. It 
suggests that the impersonality Kozel seeks is and must be 
powerfully and ineluctably personal. And it calls on us, and our 
culture, to revisit, perhaps to revise, but most vitally to recommit 
ourselves to the importance, even in our contemporary egalitarian 
and dignitarian culture, of virtue, honor, office, and the oath.    
 
 
 
 
 
 36. See Paul Horwitz, Honor’s Constitutional Moment: The Oath and Presidential 
Transitions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1074–77 (2009) (discussing the indefeasibility of the 
oath-taker’s responsibility in the context of the presidential oath).  
 37. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 164 (quoting JEREMY TAYLOR, DUCTOR 
DUBITANTUM, OR THE RULE OF CONSCIENCE IN ALL HER GENERAL MEASURES 82 
(James Flesher ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (1660)).  
